Timeline of 9/11

(7:45 a.m.): Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari board Flight 11. Atta's bags contain airline uniforms and many other remarkable things, but are checked through to his final destination, making them unusable for the attacks. The bags are not loaded onto the plane in time and are later found by investigators. [ Boston Globe, 9/18/01 ] But at least two other hijackers on Flight 11 are able to use stolen uniforms and IDs to board the plane. [ Sunday Herald, 9/16/01 ] There is speculation that the bags were meant to be left behind and found. [ New Yorker, 10/1/01 ]

(Before 7:59 a.m.): Hijacker Mohamed Atta on Flight 11 calls hijacker Marwan Alshehhi in Flight 175 as both planes sit on the runway. They confirm the plot is on. [“Just before 8:00,” Time, 8/4/02 (B) ]

Flight 11's intended and actual routes. Why did the plane go so far northwest (before turning south), for seemingly no reason? [USA Today]

(7:59 a.m.): Flight 11 takes off from Boston's Logan Airport, 14 minutes after scheduled departure. [7:45 (actually the scheduled time), Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 , 7:59, ABC News, 7/18/02 , 7:59, CNN, 9/17/01 , 7:59, Washington Post, 9/12/01 , 7:59, Washington Post, 9/12/01 (C) , 8:00, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:00, Associated Press, 8/19/02 , 8:00, Newsday, 9/10/02 ]

8:13 a.m.: The last routine communication between ground control and the pilots of Flight 11. The pilot responds when told to turn right. But almost immediately afterwards he fails to respond to a command to climb. [ Boston Globe, 11/23/01 , 8:13:31, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C) ]

American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767.

(8:13 a.m.): Flight 11 is hijacked around this time. One flight controller says the plane is hijacked over Gardner, Massachusetts, less than 50 miles west of Boston. [ Nashua Telegraph, 9/13/01 ] The storming of the cockpit doesn't appear to happen until after 8:21, yet communication with ground control stops now. Fifteen minutes after takeoff, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 , “A few minutes into the flight,” ABC News, 7/18/02 ] As the Boston Globe put it, “It appears that the hijackers' entry was surprising enough that the pilots did not have a chance to broadcast a traditional distress call,” a button that would have taken only a few seconds to press. [ Boston Globe, 11/23/01 ]

Flight 11's manifest. Such details on other flights haven't been released. [Edited, from AP and Sydney Morning Herald]

(After 8:13 a.m.): Shortly after flight controllers ask Flight 11 to climb to 35,000 feet, the transponder stops transmitting. The transponder is the electronic device that identifies the jet on the controller's screen, gives its exact location and altitude, and also allows a four-digit emergency hijack code to be sent. Air traffic manager Glenn Michael says later, “We considered it at that time to be a possible hijacking.” [“When given permission to climb to 35,000 feet,” Associated Press, 8/12/02 , “8:13:47—46R: AAL11, now climb maintain FL350,” New York Times, 10/16/01 (C) , shortly after trying emergency frequencies, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01 ] “Just moments” after radio contact is lost (which is discussed by flight controllers at 8:15), the transponder is turned off. [ MSNBC, 9/15/01 ] NORAD officially says it is not notified the plane is hijacked until 8:40—27 minutes later, though one NORAD employee contradicts this (see 8:31 a.m. and (8:40 a.m.)). [ NORAD, 9/18/01 ] Colonel Robert Marr, head of NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector, later claims the transponder is turned off some time after 8:30. [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ]

(After 8:14 a.m.): At some point after the hijacking begins, the pilot of Flight 11, John Ogonowski, activates the talk-back button, enabling Boston flight controllers to hear what is being said in the cockpit. A controller says, “The button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York.” An article later notes that “his ability to do so also indicates that he was in the driver's seat much of the way” to the WTC. Such transmissions continue until about 8:38. [ Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01 , MSNBC, 9/15/01 ]

(8:15 a.m.): Boston flight control tries but fails to contact the pilots of Flight 11, even using emergency frequencies. [8:14, Guardian, 10/17/01 ] A Boston flight controller states of Flight 11, “He won't answer you. He's nordo roger thanks”. Nordo means “no radio.” [8:15, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C) , “over the Hudson river,” CNN, 9/17/01 ]

8:20 a.m.: Flight 11 stops transmitting its IFF (identify friend or foe) beacon signal. [ CNN, 9/17/01 ]

(8:20 a.m.): Flight 11 starts to veer dramatically off course around this time. [USA Today flight path image, on this page] Recall that if a plane goes two miles off course, it should be considered an emergency situation. [ MSNBC, 9/12/01 ]

(8:20 a.m.): Boston flight control decides that Flight 11 has probably been hijacked, but apparently it doesn't notify other flight control centers for another five minutes, and don't notify NORAD for about another 20 minutes. [“About 8:20,” Newsday, 9/23/01 , “about 8:20,” New York Times, 9/15/01 (C) ] ABC News will later say, “There doesn't seem to have been alarm bells going off, traffic controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There's a gap there that will have to be investigated.” [ ABC News, 9/14/01 ]

Daniel Lewin.

(Before 8:21 a.m.): Four hijackers get up from their seats and stab or shoot passenger Daniel Lewin, who once belonged to the Israel Defense Force, Sayeret Matkal, a top-secret counter-terrorist unit. He was sitting in front of one of the three hijackers in business class. A very preliminary FAA memo says Lewin is shot by Satam Al Suqami at 9:20. Clearly the time is a typo; perhaps 8:20 is meant? [ ABC News, 7/18/02 , UPI, 3/6/02 , Washington Post, 3/2/02 (B) ]

(8:21 a.m.): Inside Flight 11 and near the back of the plane, flight attendant Betty Ong calls Vanessa Minter at American Airlines reservations in North Carolina, using a seatback GTE Airfone. She begins relaying information to manager Craig Marquis at American Airlines' operations center in Fort Worth, but she can't transfer the call. Another supervisor named Nydia Gonzales also listens in from 8:27. Ong talks for 25 minutes, until the plane crashes. The FBI says that only the first four minutes were recorded, but won't release the tape. Other flight attendants relay information about what is happening in the front. She says the hijackers sprayed something in the first-class cabin to keep people out of the front of the plane. It burns her eyes and she is having trouble breathing. In hushed tones, she tells of a passenger dead (presumably Daniel Lewin) and a crew member dying. [“25 minute phone call until crash,” ABC News, 7/18/02 , Boston Globe, 11/23/01 , USA Today, 8/13/02 ]

Flight attendants Amy Sweeney (left) and Betty Ong (right).

(8:21 a.m.): Another Flight 11 attendant, Amy Sweeney, calls American Airlines ground manager Michael Woodward and speaks calmly to him for 25 minutes until the plane crashes. Supposedly the call is not recorded but Woodward took notes. [ ABC News, 7/18/02 ] However, the Boston Globe says it has a transcript of the call. [ Boston Globe, 11/23/01 ] Her first comment is, “Listen, and listen to me very carefully. I'm on Flight 11. The airplane has been hijacked.” She identifies four hijackers (not the five said to be on the plane) and gives the seat numbers for them. Even before the plane crashes, staff are able to determine the names, phone numbers, addresses, and credit card information for these four hijackers, including Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari. She reports that two flight attendants have been stabbed and a passenger has had his throat slashed. She says the hijackers seem to be of Middle Eastern descent. [“Over the next 25 minutes,” ABC News, 7/18/02 , Associated Press, 10/5/01 ]

(After 8:21 a.m.): While flight attendant Amy Sweeney is relating details on the phone about the hijackers, the men are storming the front of the plane. She says they “just gained access to the cockpit.” It's probable she calls just after the storming begins, and it is during this struggle when the hijackers stab the two first-class flight attendants nearest to the cockpit, Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin. Sweeney says the hijackers have a bomb with yellow wires attached. [ ABC News, 7/18/02 , Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 ] If so, he would have begun the hijack around 8:13, but would only received reinforcements and had Mohamed Atta take over the flying of the plane around now. [ Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 , Associated Press, 10/5/01 , ABC News, 7/18/02 ]

Flight 11 pilot John Ogonowski.

(8:24 a.m.): The pilot of Flight 11, John Ogonowski, activates the talk-back button, enabling Boston flight controllers to hear a hijacker on Flight 11 say to the passengers: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport.” A controller responds, “Who's trying to call me?” The hijacker continues, “Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.” [8:24:38, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:24:38, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C) , 8:24, Boston Globe, 11/23/01 , 8:28, New York Times, 9/12/01 , before 8:28, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01 ] Immediately after hearing this voice, the controller “knew right then that he was working a hijack.” [ Village Voice, 9/13/01 ] Ben Sliney, the FAA's National Operations Manager, soon hears of the message “We have some planes” and later says the phrase haunts him all morning. [ USA Today, 8/13/02 ]

8:25 a.m.: 2004-04-08 Boston flight controllers notify other flight control centers of the Flight 11 hijacking, but supposedly they don't notify (NORAD for another 6 or 15 minutes (see 8:31 a.m. and (8:40 a.m.)). [8:25:00, Guardian, 10/17/01 ] Note that this means the controllers working Flights 77 and Flight 93 would have been aware of Flight 11's hijacking from this time. [ Village Voice, 9/13/01 ]

8:28 a.m.: Boston flight control radar sees Flight 11 making an unplanned 100-degree turn to the south (they're already way off-course). Flight controllers say they never lost sight of the flight, though they could no longer determine altitude once the transponder was turned off. [ Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01 ] Before this turn, the FAA had tagged Flight 11's radar dot for easy visibility, and at American Airlines headquarters at least, “All eyes watched as the plane headed south. On the screen, the plane showed a squiggly line after its turn near Albany, then it straightened.” [ Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01 ] “Boston Center could still track it on primary radar….” [ Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ] Boston flight controller Mark Hodgkins later says, “I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down.” [ ABC, 9/6/02 ] Clearly, an early report stating, “Boston airport officials said they did not spot the plane's course until it had crashed, and said the control tower had no unusual communication with the pilots or any crew members” [ Washington Post, 9/12/01 (C) ], is incorrect, as is another account that says flight controllers only find Flight 11 at 8:42. [ Newsday, 9/10/02 ] But apparently NEADS, part of NORAD, has different radar, and even at 8:40 they cannot find Flight 11. Boston has to periodically update NEADS on Flight 11's position by telephone until NEADS finally finds it a few minutes before it crashes into the WTC. [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 , ABC News, 9/11/02 , Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ]

8:31 a.m.: 2004-04-08 NORAD employee Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins later says that Boston flight control notifies NORAD of Flight 77's hijacking at this time, not at 8:40 as has been widely reported, even by Deskins previously (see (8:40 a.m.)) or another account claiming 8:34 (see 8:34 a.m.). [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ] Another later report states, “Shortly after 8:30 a.m., behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking [reaches] various stations of NORAD.” [ ABC News, 9/14/02 ]

8:33 a.m.: Flight controllers hear a hijacker on Flight 11 say to the passengers: “Nobody move, please, we are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves.” [8:33, Boston Globe, 11/23/01 , 8:33:59, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:33:59, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C) ]

(8:36 a.m.): On Flight 11, flight attendant Betty Ong reports that the plane tilts all the way on one side and then becomes horizontal again. Flight attendant Amy Sweeney then reports on her phone that the plane has begun a rapid descent. [“About 15 minutes” after the calls began, ABC News, 7/18/02 ]

8:37 a.m.: Flight controllers ask the Flight 175 pilots to look for a lost American Airlines plane 10 miles to the south—a reference to Flight 11. They respond that they can see it. They are told to keep away from it. [8:37:08, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:37, Boston Globe, 11/23/01 , the incident is not included in New York Times flight controller transcript of New York Times, 10/16/01 (B) ]

(8:38 a.m.): Flight 11 pilot John Ogonowski's periodic activation of the talk-back button, begun around 8:14, stops around this time. It is suggested that means this is when the hijackers replace him as pilot. [ Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01 , MSNBC, 9/15/01 ]

NORAD commander Larry Arnold. [Code One]

(8:40 a.m.): 2004-04-08 Boston flight control supposedly notifies NORAD that Flight 11 has been hijacked (another accounts say it happens earlier (see 8:31 a.m. and 8:34 a.m.). [8:38, CNN, 9/17/01 , 8:38, Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B) , 8:40, NORAD, 9/18/01 , 8:40, Associated Press, 8/19/02 , 8:40, Newsday, 9/10/02 ] Tech. Sgt. Jeremy Powell, a member of the Air National Guard at NEADS, part of NORAD, takes the call from Boston Center. [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 , Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ] He gives the phone to Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, regional Mission Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise: “I picked up the line and I identified myself to the Boston Center controller, and he said, we have a hijacked aircraft and I need to get you some sort of fighters out here to help us out.” Deskins then tells Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, “I have FAA on the phone, the shout line, Boston Center. They said they have a hijacked aircraft.” Marr then calls Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD's command Center in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and says, “Boss, I need to scramble [fighters at] Otis [Air National Guard Base].” Arnold later says, “I said go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get the authorities later.” [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ] Deskins later says that initially she and “everybody” else at NEADS thought the call was part of the Vigilant Guardian exercise. After the phone call she had to clarify to everyone that it was not a drill. [ Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ] NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also says that when he hears of the hijacking at this time, “The first thing that went through my mind was, is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?” [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ]

(8:40 a.m.): Major Daniel Nash (codenamed Nasty) and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (codenamed Duff) are the two F-15 pilots who would scramble after Flight 11 and then Flight 175. Nash says that at this time, a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base tells him that a flight out of Boston has been hijacked, and to be on alert. [ Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02 ] NEADS senior technician Jeremy Powell also later says that he telephones Otis Air Base and tells it to upgrade its “readiness posture.” [ Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ] Duffy also says he is told in advance about the hijacking by the FAA in Boston. [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 ] Nash and Duffy put on their flight gear and get ready. [ Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02 ] They are already halfway to their jets when “battle stations” are sounded. Duffy briefs Nash on what he knows, and, “About 4-5 minutes later, we [get] the scramble order and [take] off.” [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 ]

United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767.

8:41 a.m.: The pilots of Flight 175 tell ground control about Flight 11, “We figured we'd wait to go to your center. We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed the mike and said: ‘Everyone stay in your seats.’ It cut out.” [8:41, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:41, Newsday, 9/10/02 , 8:41:32, New York Times, 10/16/01 (B) ] An alternate version: “We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure from B-O-S [Boston's airport code]. Sounds like someone keyed the mike and said, ‘Everyone, stay in your seats.’” [ Boston Globe, 11/23/01 ] The last transmission from Flight 175, still discussing this message, comes a few seconds before 8:42. [ New York Times, 10/16/01 (B) ]

F-15 pilot Major Daniel Nash. []

(8:45 a.m.): Just prior to the crash of Flight 11, flight attendant Amy Sweeney is asked on the phone if she can recognize where she is. She says, “I see the water. I see the buildings. I see buildings,” then after a pause, a quiet “Oh, my God!” Mere seconds later the line goes dead. Meanwhile, flight attendant Betty Ong ends her call repeating the phrase “Pray for us” over and over. Apparently there is quiet instead of screaming in the background. [ ABC News, 7/18/02 ]

(8:46 a.m.): Two F-15 fighters are ordered to scramble from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts to find Flight 11, approximately 190 miles from the known location of the plane and 188 miles from New York City. Fighters in nearer bases are not scrambled. [8:39, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01 , 8:44, CNN, 9/17/01 , 8:44, Washington Post, 9/15/01 , 8:44, Los Angeles Times, 9/17/01 , 8:46, NORAD, 9/18/01 ] Supposedly, the scramble order comes after only one phone call—the decision is made to act first and get clearances later. [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 ] According to the two pilots, Major Daniel Nash and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, they are geared up and walking toward their planes when this alarm to scramble sounds. As soon as they strap in, the green light to launch goes on, and they're up even before their jets' radar kicks in. [ Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02 ]

Flight 11 hits the WTC North Tower at 8:46. Note that few images exist of this hit. [Gamma Press]

8:46:26 a.m.: 2004-04-08 Flight 11 slams into the north tower, 1 World Trade Center. [8:45, CNN, 9/12/01 , 8:45, New York Times, 9/12/01 , 8:46, New York Times, 9/12/01 , 8:46, CNN, 9/17/01 , 8:46, NORAD, 9/18/01 , 8:46, Washington Post, 9/12/01 , 8:46, Associated Press, 8/19/02 , 8:46, USA Today, 9/3/02 , 8:46, USA Today, 8/13/02 , 8:46, Newsday, 9/10/02 , 8:47:00, Guardian, 10/17/01 , 8:48, MSNBC, 9/22/01 , 8:46:26, New York Times, 9/11/02 , 8:46:26, seismic records, USA Today, 12/20/01 ] Investigators believe the plane still has about 10,000 gallons of fuel and is traveling 470 mph. [ New York Times, 9/11/02 ] It strikes the 93rd through 98th floors in the 110 story building. At the crash point and above, approximately 1,360 people die and none survived. Below the crash line, approximately 72 die and more than 4,000 survive. Both towers are slightly less than half full, with between 5,000 to 7,000 in each tower. This is mainly because many office workers haven't shown up to work yet and tourists to the observation deck opening at 9:30 have yet to arrive. USA Today, 12/20/01 ]

(Between 8:46-9:03 a.m.): As soon as Boston flight controllers hear news that a plane might have hit the WTC, they know it was Flight 11. They have been tracking it continually since it began behaving erratically. It takes “several minutes” for Boston to report to NORAD that Flight 11 is responsible. [ New York Times, 9/13/01 (F) , Newhouse News, 1/25/02 ] However, flight controllers in New York City complain that they aren't given a conclusive report of what happened to Flight 11 until just before Flight 175 crashes at 9:03. “We had 90 to 120 seconds; it wasn't any 18 minutes,” says one controller, referring to the actual elapsed time between the two crashes. Another controller says: “They dove into the airspace. By the time anybody saw anything, it was over.” [ New York Times, 9/13/01 (F) ]

A typical F-15.

8:52 a.m.: Two F-15s take off from Otis ANG Base, six minutes after being ordered to go after Flight 11, which has already crashed. [8:52, NORAD, 9/18/01 , 8:52, CNN, 9/17/01 , 8:53, Washington Post, 9/12/01 , 8:52, Washington Post, 9/15/01 , 8:52, ABC News, 9/11/02 ] This is 38 minutes after flight controllers lost contact with the plane. They go after Flight 175 instead. According to Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, one of the pilots, before takeoff, a fellow officer had told him “This looks like the real thing.” He says, “It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way.” A NORAD commander has said the planes were stocked with extra fuel as well. [ Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02 ] An F-15 can travel over 1875 mph. [ Air Force News, 7/30/97 ] Duffy later says, “As we're climbing out, we go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” He says his target destination is over Kennedy airport in New York City. [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ] According to Major Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, “The pilots [fly] ‘like a scalded ape,’ topping 500 mph but [are] unable to catch up to the airliner.” [ Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01 ] ABC News later says, “The fighters are hurtling toward New York at mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour.” [ ABC News, 9/11/02 ] NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold says they head straight for New York City at about 1100 to 1200 mph. [ MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C) , Slate, 1/16/02 ] “An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes, according to an Otis spokeswoman.” [ Cape Cod Times, 9/16/01 ] At an average speed of 1125 mph, they would reach the city in 10 minutes—9:02. So if NORAD commander Arnold's speed is correct, these fighters should reach Flight 175 just before it crashes.

9:06 a.m.: All air traffic facilities nationwide are notified that the Flight 11 crash into the WTC was probably a hijacking. [ House Committee, 9/21/01 , Newsday, 9/23/01 ]

WTC north tower collapses at 10:28. The collapse takes only about four seconds. [Reuters]

10:28 a.m.: The World Trade Center's north tower collapses. It was hit by Flight 11 at 8:46. [10:28, MSNBC, 9/22/01 , 10:28, CNN, 9/12/01 , 10:28, New York Times, 9/12/01 , 10:28, Associated Press, 8/19/02 , 10:28 (based on seismic data), New York Times, 9/12/01 , 10:29, Washington Post, 9/12/01 , 10:28:31, ] The death toll could have been much worse—an estimated 15,000 people made it out of the WTC to safety. [ ]